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Book Reviews
TWO VIEWS ON:

Ethics at the Edges of Life:
Medical and Legal Intersections
Paul Ramsey
Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1978. xvii + 353 pp. , $15.00.
An unusually penetrating and deservedly respected voice in contemporary
theological ethics again brings logic to bear on literally "life and death" choices.
This work, based on the 1975 Bampton Lectures at Columbia University, includes
an impressively thorough review and interpretation of pertinent law and public
policy. Ramsey 's standard of ethical assessment is the principle of equality specified as care for each human person according to his or her need, rather than merit
or usefulness (161, 205). He appeals to the Judaeo-Christian respect for th e dignity and value of all persons, and to the law 's traditional protection of eac h
individual 's life, in an effort to reestablish the Western pro-life bias which he
perceives to be slipping through the unravelling "moral fabric of this nation" (4,
9).

As in his influential The Patient as Person (1970), Ramsey surveys the medicalmoral scene from a theological vantage point, but acknowledges a diverse
audience , and anticipates the "convergence" of religious and humanistic outlooks at the level of special moral problems. An interesting twist is Ramsey 's
assertion that our Western culture is so imbued with Christian values that a
theoretical bridge from religious to secular ethics is not in need of construction
(xiii-xiv). Affirming life as a gift and a trust from the Creator, Ramsey enjoins
covenant love or agape and steadfast fidelity to persons as constitutive of "care"
in medical practice (146-147, 161 , 218-219). Reformulations of the author 's
previously published positions (on abortion, mercy-killing , withholding treatment)
exhibit a renewed conservatism toward the protection of life, whether born or
unborn, "wanted" or aborted, normal or abnormal, nondying or dying, competent
or incompetent.
The first of the book's two parts deals with ethics at "The First of Life."
Therein Ramsey criticizes the 1976 United States Supreme Court decision that a
Missouri statute requiring spousal or parental consent for an abortion was unconstitutional (Planned Parenthood v. Danforth); statutory and institu t ional "conscience clauses" exempting conscientious objectors from participation in abortions, ostensibly without penalty ; and the Edelin case and its implications for
responsibilities to aborted fetuses. Central to the section is Ramsey's affirmation
of the equality principle in abortion as in other medical matters. In his concern
for the protection of fetal human life, he vehemently re nounces the creeping
"atomistic individualism " (9, 12 , 15) which he perceives to be root decisions to
abort, procedures for securing and performing abortions, and standards of care for
or disposal of fetuses.
Roman Catholic medical professionals may be interested to note and evaluate
Ramsey 's faulting of recent Catholic discussions of "cooperation " in a pluralistic
society (Catholic Hospital Ethics, a report of a commission of the Catholic Theological Society of America; arguments of Charles E. Curran about sterilization
from which Ramsey analogizes, however legitimately, to abortion) as excessively
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concerned with rights of the individual patient to the detriment of institutional
protection of the professional m ed ical conscience (84).
The second section of the book, "The Last of Life , " in part develops and
revises insights published in The Patient as Person. This half treats of "euthanasia," and allowing to die or "only caring" for the dying ; of care for defective
newborns ; and of the ethica l assumptions and implications of legal landmarks such
as the Quinlan and Saikewicz cases and the California Natural Death Act.
Ramsey's primary project is to replace traditional standards for administering or
withholding treatment, including the classificatory distinction between ord inary
and extraordinary means , with a " medical indications policy" of care (153- 1 55,
165). He rejects any "q uality of life " assessments and establishes an "objective"
or "phys iological " medical basis for treatment (159, 206). In general, physically
beneficial treatments should be provided to competent and incompetent, normal
and abnormal patients alike. The only legiti mate distinction is between patients
who are dying and those who are not. For the person near death , "only caring " or
"co mforting " may become more appropriate than life-sustaining procedures
(165).
Ramsey 's main concern in this section is to avoid slipping down the slope
toward direct involuntary euthanasia, through a po licy of "subst ituted judgment"
whereby death is the impu ted interest of abnOl'mal and incompetent but nondying individuals (332). He rejects "qual ity of life" arguments against treatment
because they might also be emp lo yed to justify direct killing; he rejects "substituted judgments" for non treatment or dea th in the intel'est of the non-dy ing
patient because such judgments might also be made to justify deaths of the
abnormal in the interests of others. Ramsey asserts than any decision mad e for an
incompetent patient should as a "rule of practice" favor life (165). While this is
certainly a valid claim , it might still be asked whether Richard McCormick 's
proposal of relational potential as a minimal quality of life criterion, for allowing
some viable patients to die, is more meritorious a nd less sinister than Ramsey
concedes. Certainly McCormick does not mean that our duty to protect life as
valuable ever ceases, but that what is indicated as genuinely beneficial to the
patient incapable of relationship may change. Ramsey's proposal of a physical
standard of benefit and therefore of "medically indicated " treatment may purchase objectivity at the price of a more refined ethical sensit ivity to the needs of
the most vulnerable claimers of care.
Need the validity of evaluations of life's quality in t reatment decisions about
incompetent patients be negated by Ramsey's fear of directing "the edge of the
wedge" toward involuntary euthanasia? First, it must yet be shown either that
there is justification for direct killing as well as omitting treatment, or that there is
no morally relevant distinction between the two acts. Second, if consent by
proxy is a good mode in which to meet the needs of incompetents , it must be
shown both that adequate safeguards of their interests cannot be built into the
decision-making process, and that the social danger of making subst ituted judgments on the basis of worth to others is great enough to justify depriving incompetent persons of proxies who will act for their welfare even when that includes
death.
Ramsey's own tentative exceptions to the pro-life practice which prohib its
euthanasia are based on an evaluation of some individuals as not "living pel'sons"
(e.g., anencephalic infants) and of other persons as "beyond care" (e.g., victims of
Lesch-Nyhan syndrome), a move perhaps not entirely consistent with his principle that medical care (if not life-prolonging treatment) be unceasing (215, 219).
While Ramsey concedes that such patients might morally be permitted to die or
even directly be killed, choice of death always remains exceptional and ought
never evolve into a general practice of euthanasia for specifiable categories of
patients.
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Ethics at the Edges of Life is et hical analysis in Ramsey 's cha racter istically
careful , rigorous, and precise style. While much of it is directed at "opponents"
past and prese nt, and it is too detailed to serve as an overview of t he issu es, most
et hicians , legal scho lars, and medical professional s will appreciate Ramsey 's painstaking attention to the complexities of each question he addresses. Ramsey is a
rare theologian who can reflect and publish rapidly and co mpete ntly on current
technical a nd lega l developments, thereby writing not, as he him se lf allows, "for
ages to come," but for the possibility of interve ntion in the headlong course of
events toward them.
- Lisa Sowle Cahill
Assistant Professor of Theology
Boston College

Iss ues of life and d eath , law and medicine , ethics and pub lic policy are the
subject of profound and prolonged debate on the contempora,·y scene. It is w ith a
ce,·lain se nse of excite m e nt then that we find the probing mind of Paul R a msey
addressing these su bjects. £fhics af the Edge of Life, a series of essays developed
from the 197 5 Brampton Lectures at Co lum bia U ni ve rs ity, is Ramsey 's vehicl e for
exp loring the m edica l and lega l inte rsections at what h e labels "the first and t h e
last of life ."
The fram ewor k is a n interesting one becau se the last decade has seen an enormou s development of lega l and moral problems surro unding birth and d eat h:
abortion, euthanasia , treatment of d efec tive newbo rn s, termination of medical
care for incompetents, etc. It is to these issues that Ram sey applies his a na lys is in
the hope, as h e puts it , of e ngaging doctors , law yers, ethicists and t h e general
public in a dialogue of the specific dilemmas posed by these probl ems . Any hope
of dia logue, thou gh , quickly eva porates as Ramsey utilizes his relentless log ic and
biting sarcasm to drive a wedge betwee n him and those whom h e seeks to
infiu e nct'.
Ramsey's well-known a nd skillfully argued opposition to abortion is reduced
here to snide attacks on the logic of the Supre me Court's post- Wade decisions, as
if m erely noting the inconsiste nci es, incongruiti es, and inadequacies of t h e opinions will overturn the d ecisio ns . He reach es the worst of these tendencies in a
chapter on the £delil1 decision , an aberrant case of a Boston City Hospital doctor
whose conv iction of manslaughter of a viable aborted fetus was overturned (o n
procedural grounds) by the Massac husetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Tht' court itse lf concluded that the value of the case as precedent was minimal
because it arose in an " interregnum - a kind of time not likel y to be re peated ,"
i.e., when the Commonwea lth had no abortion statute. Even though t h e court
split three ways and there was no clear rule of law resulting from it, Ramsey
devot ed nearly 50 pages of tedious text to the various opinions.
In an interesting scenario, Ramsey recreates in story form a conversat ion h e
had with a Massachusetts lawyer fri e nd on the Edelin case and then reveals his
"fee ling a littl e threatened " when the lawyer "presumed to go behind the robes of
mystery ." The friend s ugges ted "th e re may have been an aura surrounding t his
case which highlighted the wisdom, propriet y, and maybe even the necess ity of
making a final de te rmination at the appell ate leve l to forego further rendering of
the social fabric by a second tr ial. Perhaps, this was all the more wise , proper , and
necessary beca use of South Boston school situation.
. H e re I sto pped hi s soc io logical speculat ions."
The reaction reveals much of Ramsey's fai lu re to understa nd the judicial
process. As Robert McClosky reminds us in his insightful Th e A mericGIl Supreme
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Court: Th e first lesso n to be learned of the Court is that "it is a politi cal inst itution." To be aware of t hat fact is to save oneself hours of p ainstak ing sifting of
arguments which , in fact , h ave littl e to do with the actual outco m e of t h e case.
In his chapter on e uthan asia, Ramsey calls for t h e scrapping of t h e traditional
distinction betwee n ordinary /ex traordinary treatments and su bstituting of "a
m edical indications polic y." H e d oes t his to avo id what he sees as an increasing
tendency to uti li ze "a qu ali ty-of- life" sta ndard . The di fficulty is that his translation is highly ambiguous, e.g., "a conscious, competent, ' in cu rab le' pat ie nt woul d
h ave a relative righ t to refuse treatment in the co u rse of sh ared decis ion-making
concerning his or her case." Wh at does that mea n ?
One principle p e rvad es all o f R am sey's thinking: the need for a n undiminished
ob ligat ion to sustain life. The prob lem is t h at Ramsey elevates the princip le into
a n abso lute and thus h as an easy out from what , in fact, are d if ficu lt moral a nd
m edical dilemmas. H e fl ees to his a bsolute rather t han face the agonizing struggl e
Richard McCormick graphicall y presents in hi s now fam ous JAMA artic le on
defective newborns, " T o Save or L et Die" (Jul y 8, 1974). Ramsey does t h is
because he is afrai d of t h e sli ppery slope. His reason for never not treati ng severely
defective newborns is th at "to beg in to introduce death as a practice would b e o ne
more ste p in the eros ion of the m ora l distinction between volu n tary an d in voluntary e uthanasi a." Bu t as McCormick notes, with th e development of mod e rn
technology, we must shift the question from "Can we keep t his patient a li ve?" to
"What kind of a life al'e we sav ing?" Such question s, d espite Ramsey's fears and
protests , a re irret ri evably "q u ality-o f-li fe" judgments and t here is n o avo iding
t he m.
Along with hi s a rgu m en ta tion from absolu tes, Ram sey h as a n irritating te nd e ncy to push every lega l state m ent to its logical extreme a nd then so m e, e.g., he
wou ld rea d the Quinlan opi ni o n to m ea n that the court could order th e respirator
tu rned off o ver the pa rents' objectio ns if it d etermin ed that Kare n A nn a nd " the
overw h elmin g m ajority" would want it off. I n doin g so, Ram sey forgets Ju stice
Oliver We nd ell Holm es' adm onit ion that "It is ex perience not logic th at is the life
of t h e law."
For one who sc ru t in izes lega l cases with exacting care, Ram sey is a decidedly
poor interpreter of lega l phrases a nd a yet poorer prognosticator of judicial
rulings. He clearly m isinterprets - or simpl y misund e rstand s - so basic a concept
in t h e law as "s ubstituted judgm e nt " wh en he wr ites, "Th is means ( in the case of
incompetents) in treatment d ec isions to use as a nOI'm t he treat m e nt offered to
normal patients" ( p . 286 , n. 19). As the Suprem e Judi c ial Court's Saihewicz
opinion m ade cl ear, it m ea ns no suc h t hingl
R a m sey wanted t h at res ul t in Saihewicz and so read hi s ow n des ir es into th e
phra se. He then confid e ntly predicted , " Substituted judgm e nt cannot as such be
ex t e nd ed to t h e Saihewicz case." It was , as readers fam ili al' with t he case know,
the basis for the Suprem e Judicial Cou rt's unanimou s opinion in Saihewicz. Such a
gri evous misrea ding of t he co urt serious ly undel'mines both Ramsey 's cred ibility
an d hi s dispass ioned " legal schola rship ."
Pe rh aps t he clearest insight in to Ramsey 's t hin king is his open admiss ion that
hi s theology is fashi one d from th e R eformation e m p h asis on the "to tal depravity "
o f man . That Lu t hera n emph asis overshadows all other considerations of huma n
nature. Given the co rru pti on, Ramsey bel ieves we can never trust m e n to behave
in a "co rrect" mann e r. Instead, h e argues , we mu st re ly o n abso lu te rules and
rigid ly e nforced laws to pI-eve n t m en from slipping in to their natura l propensity to
sin.

His o u t look ex pl ai ns, in
text on judges as ign orant ,
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part , the constant att acks that appea l' t hroughout t he
prosecutors as cowards, doct o l's as uninform ed , moral publi c as untl·u stwOl·th y. Of suc h is the visio n of a
th e ethos of present soc iety," whose on ly hope fo r t h e
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world is "the Holy Spirit's power to bring about an earthquake in contemporary
moral opinion." Understandable though it is, Ramsey 's position is not one that
commends itself to those who seriously hope to influence and transform society
rather than merely lament its condition or wait in fear and trembling for God to
intervene. Moreover, it is hardly the stance of one open to the genuine dialogue
proposed in the preface.
We may conclude by quoting from an earlier comment of Richard McCormick:
"In an excellent book , The Patient as Person, Ramsey's description of the duty of
caring for the dying is the most beautiful and Christian avai lable." That book , to
date, has not been improved upon and , hopefully, will continue to overshadow
this sad exercise in polemics, nit-picking, and intramural sparing. In sum , Ramsey
still has much to contribute to the ongoing debate in medical:legal ethics, but
unfortunately, not in this publication which h e promises will be his "last book in
medical ethics."
- John J . Paris, S.J.
Associate Professor of Social Ethics
Holy Cross College

TWO VIEWS ON:

Health Care Ethics
Benedict M. Ashley, O.P. and Kevin D. O'Rourke, O.P.
Catholic Hospital Association, 1438 Grand Blvd. , St. Louis, Mo. 63104, 1978. xii
+ 507 pp, $13.00, soft cover.
Christian medical practitioners and health care profess ionals sta nd to benefit
greatly from this careful and comprehensive study of current m edical-moral and
bioethical problems written by Fathers Ashley and O'Rourke. Father O ' RoUl'ke is
the present medical·moral advisor for the Catholic Hospital Association. Father
Ashley is a professor of moral theology at Aquinas Institute, and was recently
granted the prestigious Master of Sacred Theology degree from the Dominican
Order. Both authors are highly skilled theologians, as well as philosoph ers and
moralists , who have combined their substantial skills to create this comprehensive ,
well organized and well-written study of moral problems in current health care.
This study thoroughly investigates philosophical, theological and moral aspects of
bioethical reasoning, abortion, contraception, triage, psychotherapy and pastoral
care. The primary value of the wOl'k is that it integrates the latest and most
advanced theological and philosophical d evelopm e nts with moral analyses of problems in these areas. While it is often difficu lt to distinguish the work of many
moral theologians from that of bioethicists and medical moralists , the distinctive
theological character of this work is quite evident. This work is clearly a work of
moral theology , and it is wl'itten for the ex plicit purpose of providing guidelines
for Christian health care .
Of significant value in this work is the notion of human totality and integrity,
for this principle mak es it possibl e to deduce the grounds for the c laim of human
persons to an a bsolute and unconditional right to life. The integrity of the human
person rests upon a capacity for integrating ordel's of mean ing, logic and value for
the purposes of generating richer and more complex orders. The class of pel·sons is
the only class possessing this active capability of synth es is and integration for that
purpose. This enables persons to actualize meanings a nd values that are morally
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